The Ukraine Faceoff


Operation Disclosure | By David Lifschultz, Contributing Writer

Submitted on December 8, 2021


Compliments of the Lifschultz Organization founded in 1899

The control of the Ukraine is in hands of Lord Jacob Rothschild through the oligarchs there just as it is in Russia. Both countries continue to be looted. Putin is a weak leader who tries to balance the power among the various factions but the Central Bank of Russia is controlled by Sergey Shvetsov who ferried over a trillion dollars of stolen money for the oligarchs to London for Lord Jacob. As they say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating and in Russia the fact that the oligarchs still control their companies though stolen demonstrates the weakness of Putin.

In 2014 Brzezinski set up the Kiev Coup after he found out that the Russian military had spent 8 years developing massive defensive missiles which seal their air space and then started the modernization of their land army for 12 years. He wanted to incite another Afghanistan where he lured the Russians into Afghanistan to give them a Vietnam war. That Afghani war required over 100,000 Russian troops as a drain, and combined with 400,000 at the Chinese border set up by the Nixon approach, and 600,000 at the Warsaw Pact, and you had quite a drain of Russian resources. Then, we introduced the crash of the oil price in 1985 by ordering the Gulf States to dump their oil, and half the Russian budget was impaired. We demoralized the Russian Army with the Star Wars fiction and Russia collapsed as we turned Yeltsin into a CIA agent.

As an aside, we set up the poor Afghani people for this war and later repaid our ally by invading it to restart the heroin production that Mullah Omar had shut down. Osama bin Laden was merely a patsy.

So Ends the Afghanistan Heroin War


So Ends the Afghanistan Heroin War: Part 2

In 2014 they had only completed half the task. Putin told the military that Obama promised to leave the Ukraine under the control of Russia if they did not shoot the protesters at Maidan and lost the Ukraine based on that lie but seized the Crimea and the Luhansk and Donbas coal mines came under Russian control. The Ukraine has agriculture now but not much else and is a drain on anyone who controls it so neither Russia and the US will bail them out. Brzezinski went on to create the Syrian adventure to pave the way for a natural gas pipeline from Qatar through Syria to the west to destroy Gazprom exports to the EU but here Russia intervened. They won. Brzezinski failed to pull off a Russian collapse as at 1990-1991.

The Russian military was displeased at losing most of the Ukraine and had been earlier infuriated when Putin gave up the major Vaziani military base in Georgia. They insisted on taking the Crimea and protecting Luhansk and
Donbas coal mines.

Vaziani, situated some twenty kilometers outside Tbilisi, is a sprawling complex of military installation which include Russia’s largest and best equipped military airfield in the South Caucasus, firing ranges, arms and ammunition depots, chemical munitions stores, fuel stockpiles, hangars and garages capable of accommodating large numbers of planes and armored vehicles, troop barracks and many other facilities. Some of these are located on the 10,000 hectares of land of the base itself; other installations are dispersed in the Tbilisi area and in the city itself, but are organic to the Vaziani base. Those include the Russian tank repair plant and armor depot in Tbilisi–an installation that Moscow’s negotiators attempted until the last moment to retain for Russia. There is no clear information yet about the resolution of this issue.

Putin was going to give up later without a fight Abkhazia and South Ossetia but his orders to leave were countermanded by the military who also forced the seizure of the Crimea and the protection of the Donbas and Luhansk.

The Ukraine is now a basket case economy. The Unemployment is officially 9.48% in 2020 but sources say it is more like 20% and Ukrainians are fleeing the country to Russia by the millions and to the west by the millions. Sources say at least 10 percent of the country has left.

We have covered the current situation in more detail in the following article.


Russia’s Missile Warning, US Faces Checkmate at the Ukraine

December 8, 2021

Ukraine’s Chances of Survival

There are formal mechanisms Kyiv could pursue to try to rise above its station, but none are great options.

By: Geopolitical Futures

By Viktoria Laura Herczegh

Editor’s note: The following is written by a guest columnist. Though the author’s work generally comports with our own, her writing doesn’t necessarily reflect the views of GPF.

In October 1994, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk met in Washington with then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, with whom Tarasyuk discussed the question of NATO enlargement. Expressing a growing discontent in NATO, Tarasyuk asked about America’s vision for his country. It was already an unofficial buffer state, but what exactly would that entail? A buffer zone, or more of a gray area for the U.S. to keep the newly formed Russian state at bay? Talbott said he did not yet have the right answer but would hopefully have one over time.

Any publication that talks about geopolitics, including GPF, will at some point talk about what’s known as a buffer state. These are countries that are situated between great powers, their lot in life meant to prevent hostility and potential clashes among larger rivals. Buffer states are usually demilitarized in that they don’t host the military of either rival power. When one great power invades a buffer state, a war tends to break out with one of its rivals.

Buffer states can be dated back to the very beginning of recorded international relations, some of the first ones being used during the Roman-Persian Wars (54 B.C. to A.D. 628). Since then, of course, the concept has evolved, eventually becoming a crucial part of the balance of power theory that has characterized European politics since the beginning of the 18th century.


Unsurprisingly, buffer states are at a higher risk of being taken over by surrounding powers, who believe that if they do not project authority over the buffer, their rival surely will. Buffer states functioning as such might be essential in the prevention of war, but what, if anything, do they stand to gain? Moreover, could a non-buffer state gaining a buffer status resolve a multilateral crisis?

The latter question is especially important in the current standoff between Russia and Ukraine, a prototypical buffer state that has always been stuck between Russia and the West. Geography never afforded Ukraine the opportunity to stay neutral, so its political standing and stability have always been tenuous.

For Ukraine, the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 made things even more uncertain. Ukraine is still not a member of NATO and thus has no stable alliance with the West. Put simply, neither NATO nor the European Union would help Ukraine directly. Since Crimea’s annexation, several scholars have proposed a controversial solution that would not only put an end to the conflict but put Ukraine in a more secure international position: Officially designate Ukraine as a buffer state between Russia and the West.

Is that the answer to the question Tarasyuk asked Talbott in 1994? Not quite. It would be more accurate to say there has been a suite of ideas regarding Ukraine that the U.S. has tried on at different times. There was the plan for Ukraine to serve as a check on Russian power, but Kyiv was soon deemed too weak. Soon after came the idea of Westernizing Ukraine, helping its development as a stable, independent, democratic state with a growing market economy and tighter ties to the West. This, too, was a seductive but ultimately unsuccessful idea, thanks to constant military conflict in Ukraine’s east, strenuous Russian opposition to the expansion of NATO and the EU, and icy relations between Russia and the United States.

And it turns out Ukraine didn’t exactly want to be Westernized; its linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity compel it to vacillate between East and West. Rather than choosing between a secure but limited Western status or merely being an appendage of Russia, post-Soviet Ukraine could have followed the path taken by Canada or Switzerland, economically and militarily strong countries that have found feasible ways of accommodating linguistic, ethnic and regional differences.

Unfortunately for Ukraine, Ukraine is neither particularly powerful nor influential, nor is its geographical location well suited for the kind of autonomy enjoyed by Canada and Switzerland. (Ukraine wasn’t even invited to the 31st NATO summit earlier this year.) Moving toward either side too overtly or too quickly could prove disastrous – e.g., the Crimea crisis of 2014. It’s simply in too precarious a position. The conflict in Donbass remains frozen. The build-up of Russian troops along the border all too well shows the fragility of the status quo. The Kremlin recently (again) emphasized its belief that Ukraine should not be a separate state.

Meanwhile, Kyiv expected cooperation with the U.S. to flourish after the election of U.S. President Joe Biden, who led Washington’s Ukraine policy as vice president and visited the country six times. However, optimism has given way to skepticism and disappointment. Despite concerns over Russia’s military build-up in the Black Sea, the U.S. canceled the deployment of two warships to balance the situation; the Biden administration worries that Russia’s build-up of military forces near Ukraine could incite new Russian military attacks on that country. Since the first fights broke out in eastern Ukraine following Russia’s invasion in 2014, Russian-controlled (and Russian) forces have mostly engaged with the Ukrainian army through sniping and shelling along the front lines. There have been no significant military clashes since summer 2014, though the U.N. estimates more than 13,000 people have been killed as of February 2020, including civilians.

Without much support from its more powerful “allies,” Ukraine is simply a tool for the individual interests of more powerful states, one that doesn’t offer quite enough in return to earn equal standing in an alliance. Choosing one side or another is so risky that it is almost not a choice at all. So, would formally acknowledging Ukraine as a buffer state at least temporarily solidify its position?

The problem is that has never actually been the most secure solution for geopolitical crises. A buffer state, especially a weaker one, can quickly find itself struggling between its powerful rivaling neighbors, facing the perpetual threat of attack, invasion or even destruction. Moreover, Ukraine is unique even among potential buffer states. Not only does it have an intertwined history with Russia, but the “other” state is no state at all but what we collectively call the West. Aligning with so many different interests is problematic in its own right.

Adapting a policy of non-alignment – another possible solution to Ukraine’s woes – is also tempting. But even that falls well short of a quick fix. For example, Finland, a country where well-established and carefully maintained neutrality is the basis of a successful defense model, has worked for decades to assert its current status.


Perhaps the biggest obstacle is that any solution requires a degree of strength the government in Kyiv simply does not have. It doesn’t even control the whole of Ukrainian territory. To rise above its station, Ukraine will need to adopt more strategic and subtle approaches to the parties at play rather than remaining a pawn in their game.

Fluent in Mandarin, Spanish, French and English, Viktoria Laura Herczegh is a doctoral candidate at the International Relations and Political Science Doctoral School at Corvinus University of Budapest. She received her bachelor’s degree in Chinese language and culture with a minor in Spanish language and culture at Eötvös Loránd University and her master’s degree in modern East Asian studies at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, both in Budapest. She regularly writes and publishes articles on the international legal aspects of the South China Sea dispute and China’s attitude toward international law.

David Lifschultz


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